ABSTRACT: Building on the rationalist literature on sanctions, this article argues that economic and political sanctions are a successful tool of nonproliferation policy, but that selection effects have rendered this success largely hidden. Since the late 1970s-when the U.S. made the threat of sanctions credible through congressional legislation and began regularly employing sanctions against proliferating states-sanctions have been ineffective in halting ongoing nuclear weapons programs, but they have succeeded in deterring states from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place and have thus contributed to a decline in the rate of nuclear pursuit. The logic of the argument is simple: rational leaders assess the risk of sanctions before initiating a nuclear weapons program, which produces a selection effect whereby states highly vulnerable to sanctions are deterred from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place, so long as the threat is credible. Vulnerability is a function of a state's level of economic and security dependence on the U.S.-states with greater dependence have more to lose from U.S. sanctions and are more likely to be sensitive to U.S.-sponsored norms. The end result of this selection effect is that since the U.S. made the threat of sanctions credible in the late 1970s, only insulated, inward-looking regimes have pursued nuclear weapons and become the target of imposed sanctions, thus rendering the observed success rate of nonproliferation sanctions low. I find support for the argument based on statistical analysis of a global sample of countries from 1950-2000, an original dataset of U.S. nonproliferation sanctions episodes, and qualitative analysis of the South Korean and Taiwanese nuclear weapons programs.
Starting in the 1970s and continuing to sanctions against Iran in the present day, policymakers have long considered sanctions central to U.S. efforts to halt nuclear proliferation and have employed them regularly. Many scholars of nonproliferation are similarly optimistic about the role of sanctions, arguing they are an important component of the nonproliferation policy toolkit.
1 Despite their centrality to U.S. nonproliferation policy, the efficacy of these efforts-which include financial and trade restrictions, economic and military aid cutoffs, termination of peaceful nuclear cooperation, as well as threats to weaken military alliance relationships-remains hotly debated. This disagreement is reflected in policy debates over sanctions on Iran, 2 recent scholarly work on sanctions and nuclear proliferation, 3 and an extensive literature that argues sanctions are generally ineffective. 4 As in other policy realms, selection effects pose an obstacle to assessing the efficacy of sanctions in nonproliferation. 5 As the editor of a recent volume on the topic observes, "selection effects entail the plausibility that sanctions are only applied in instances where targets estimate (correctly or incorrectly) that sanctions will not work in their own particular case." 6 In other words, if states expect that sanctions are likely and too costly to endure, they may abstain from nuclear proliferation in the first place, which may mean that sanctions succeed before they are even implemented-biasing downward our estimates of sanctions' efficacy. However, much like early work on economic sanctions that focused on cases where sanctions were imposed rather 1 Campbell and Einhorn 2004; Braun and Chyba 2004, 43-45; Montgomery 2005, 181-182; Sagan 1996 Sagan -1997 Solingen 2007, 289-299; and Levite 2002-2003, 78-80. 2 Recent examples include Esfandiary and Fitzpatrick 2011; and Maloney 2010. 3 Solingen 2012. 4 See Galtung 1967; Lindsay 1986; Pape 1997; Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Drezner 1998; Drezner 2003; and Lacy and Niou 2004. 5 See Fearon 2002 6 Solingen 2012a . Also see pages 299-301. than threatened, 7 the literature on nonproliferation has focused almost entirely on cases where sanctions were imposed. 8 While this is an important topic of inquiry, on its own it cannot settle the issue of sanctions' efficacy as an overall policy.
Building on the rationalist literature on sanctions, this article incorporates the selection effects issue into the theoretical argument and systematically tests its observational implications.
I argue that economic and political sanctions are indeed a successful nonproliferation tool, but that selection effects have rendered this success largely hidden. I provide evidence that since late 1970s-when the U.S. made clear through congressional legislation that positive economic and security relations with the United States were contingent on nonproliferation and began regularly employing sanctions against proliferating states-sanctions have been ineffective in halting ongoing nuclear weapons programs, but have succeeded in deterring states from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place and have thus contributed to a decline in the rate of nuclear pursuit. 9 The logic is simple: rational leaders assess the risk of sanctions before initiating a nuclear weapons program, which produces a selection effect whereby states highly vulnerable to sanctions are deterred from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place, so long as the threat is credible. Vulnerability is a function of a state's level of economic and security dependence on the U.S.-states with greater dependence have more to lose from U.S. sanctions and are more likely to be sensitive to U.S.-sponsored norms. The end result of this selection effect is that since the U.S. made the threat of sanctions credible in the late 1970s, only insulated, inward-looking regimes with few ties to the U.S. have pursued nuclear weapons and become the 7 Most prominently, Hufbauer, Scott, and Elliott 1990; and Pape 1997. 8 See Solingen 2012 for the most recent work in this tradition. 9 For a visualization of the decline, see Sagan 2011, c2. target of imposed sanctions, rendering the observed success rate of nonproliferation sanctions low.
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To evaluate this argument, this article tests three key observable implications: (1) controlling for other predictors of proliferation, states dependent on the U.S. economically and militarily should be significantly less likely to pursue nuclear weapons, but only since the threat of sanctions became credible in the late 1970s, (2) the observed success rate of sanctions threatened or imposed against ongoing nuclear programs should be low, and (3) 
Existing Literature on Sanctions and Nuclear Proliferation
A large body of literature examines the efficacy of economic sanctions, and while some scholars are relatively optimistic about the efficacy of imposing sanctions, 11 the majority view is that sanctions are usually ineffective in securing the desired behavioral changes from the target state. 12 The arguments for why imposed sanctions are unsuccessful fall into three different 10 Although multilateral sanctions have been imposed against recent proliferators such as North Korea and Iran, I focus on the U.S. since they have taken the lead in virtually all nonproliferation sanctions campaigns, have been by far the most frequent imposer of nonproliferation sanctions and have the most longstanding and clearly articulated sanctions regime and policies. Based on data from Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg 2008, Of 21 cases of sanctions related to nuclear proliferation identified through 2006, 14 (67%) were imposed by the U.S. 11 For example, see Baldwin 1985; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990 , and Baldwin 1999 -2000 On measuring efficacy, see Baldwin 1999 Baldwin -2000 camps, and suggest different policy implications. First are those who argue that nationalism and the possibility of substitution allow states to weather economic disruption. 13 Second are those arguing that domestic political incentives or international conflict expectations lead sanctions to be poorly designed and targeted-thus, it is not that sanctions are inherently ineffective but rather that policymakers implement them in imperfect ways. 14 Finally, and most relevant to this article's argument, a third group of scholars focuses on the rational calculations of leaders and the incentives for reaching a bargain prior to the imposition of sanctions. Their intuition is that rational states consider the future costs of sanctions when weighing their options-the result is that those who are particularly vulnerable to the sanctions will concede at the mere threat rather than defying the sender and enduring the costs.
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Turning to the literature on nuclear proliferation, extant work has identified three classes of motivations for proliferation: security, domestic politics, and norms. 16 More precisely, states pursue nuclear weapons in order to (1) ensure their security against nuclear or overwhelming conventional threats, 17 (2) serve domestic bureaucratic or political interests, 18 or (3) build international prestige or fulfill conceptions of national identity. 19 Consequently, states may renounce nuclear weapons programs when they promise to harm rather than help their security, threaten domestic political or bureaucratic interests, or when nuclear proliferation is believed to violate an important international norm or contradict a state's national identity. Apart from motivations for proliferation, recent work has examined how peaceful nuclear cooperation and 13 See Galtung 1967; Lindsay 1986; Pape 1997. 14 Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Hiscox 2011; Lindsay 1986, 153-154; Whang 2011; and Drezner 1998, 710-711 15 Lacy and Niou 2004; Drezner 2003; Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz 2005 16 This trinity of motivations was originally suggested in Sagan 1996 Sagan -1997 . Also see Paul 2000; Meyer 1984; Jo and Gartzke 2007; and Singh and Way 2004. 17 Thayer 1995. 18 Solingen 2007 19 Hymans 2006 sensitive nuclear assistance provide a supply-side impetus for the pursuit and acquisition of nuclear weapons. 20 However, no extant work systematically examines how dependence on the U.S. deters nuclear pursuit by the threat of sanctions; indeed, the role of U.S. nonproliferation policy and strategic interaction between potential proliferators and opponents of proliferation is largely absent from the literature.
Argument and Methods
Building on the rationalist work on economic sanctions, I argue that the key to understanding the dynamics of sanctions in nonproliferation is that rational leaders consider the risk of sanctions before initiating a nuclear weapons program. If the probability and cost of sanctions are sufficiently high for a given state-in particular, if they are highly dependent on the U.S. and the threat of sanctions is credible-they will not pursue nuclear weapons at all and no explicit threat of sanctions will be needed. In other words, the selection effect is one step further removed than the rationalist work on economic sanctions suggests: states can be deterred even prior to an explicitly targeted threat. As Drezner notes, "It is quite likely that potential targets try to comply with U.S. demands before the articulation of a threat…There may…be instances in which a target refrains from acting against the sender's preferences because of the anticipation of sanctions."
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The threat of sanctions can help deter proliferation by states dependent on the U.S. See Finnemore 1996; Nadelmann 1990; Barnett and Finnemore 1999; and Tannenwald 2006. 26 See Axelrod 1986; Heckathorn, 1988; Goertz and Diehl 1992; and Fehr and Fischbacher 2004. In order to test this argument, I explore multiple observable implications using a variety 27 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 902. 28 Goertz and Diehl 1992, 638 . 29 Fearon 2002, 7. 30 The target's dependence on the U.S. is also likely to be correlated with the costs of the sanctions to the U.S. Imposing sanctions that are costly to the sender more effectively conveys resolve by sinking costs (see Schelling 1966 , Fearon 1997 , and Lektzian and Sprecher 2007 . However, the threat to impose sanctions that are costly to the sender may be less credible because of the self-harm they would inflict if carried out. As I argue, the U. miscalculate the probability or cost of sanctions when initiating their nuclear pursuit, particularly those with high economic and security dependence on the U.S.
The Deterrent Effect of Nonproliferation Sanctions
The argument I've elaborated suggests that dependence on the U.S. should be associated with nuclear forbearance, but only when the threat of sanctions is credible. Importantly, however, since the NSG included the Soviet Union as well as Japan and European suppliers, its effect would not account for the decline in proliferation only among countries dependent on the United States that the theoretical argument predicts (and the evidence supports).
While the United States sponsored the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which entered into force in 1970 and prohibited non-nuclear weapons states that ratified the treaty from developing nuclear weapons, the treaty did not include an explicit sanctioning mechanism.
Moreover, while U.S. policy stood in opposition to further proliferation, President Nixon himself 33 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2011, 1082-1086. 34 Ibid, 1050-1052. 35 Nye 1981. Also see Strulak 1993. was not strongly opposed, at least among friendly states. In the long run, however, the Indian nuclear test, along with the revelation of commercial deals that promised to transfer reprocessing and enrichment technology from European suppliers to Brazil, South Korea, and Pakistan, convinced many U.S. policymakers that (1) nonproliferation needed to be a higher priority, and (2) the NPT was insufficient to halt proliferation. 40 In other words, it was precisely the limitations of the NPT-its inability to influence states that chose to remain outside the treaty and lack of controls on the spread of Reiss 1988, 232; and Perkovich 1999, 184. 40 Lellouche, 1979, 337; Martinez 2002, 262; Nye 1981, 17-18 sensitive nuclear technology that could be used to build weapons as well as for peaceful purposes-that led to the firmer U.S. sanctions policies emerging between 1976 and 1978.
41
The threat of sanctions developed between 1976 and 1978 meets the primary criteria for threat credibility identified in the deterrence literature: (1) the U.S. had both the interest and capability to carry out the threat, 42 (2) communicated the threat clearly to the world, 43 and (3) signaled its commitment by adopting hand-tying mechanisms that generate domestic audience costs. 44 First, in terms of capability, it is clear that the U.S. had the power to employ sanctions against proliferating states if it desired. The U.S. also had an interest in doing so: as one of the few states with nuclear weapons, and the only state with truly global power projection capabilities, any additional nuclear state reduced American relative power and limited the American military's influence and freedom of action. 45 As a pivotal 1965 U.S. government report concluded, additional nuclear proliferation "will add complexity and instability to the deterrent balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, aggravate suspicions and hostility among states neighboring new nuclear powers…impede the vital tasks of controlling and reducing weapons around the world, and eventually constitute direct military threats to the U.S."
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Although it took about a decade until the U.S. developed enforcement mechanisms, this blanket policy of opposition to nuclear proliferation was ultimately applied to allies and enemies alike, and was largely driven by the belief in a nuclear domino theory-once one state got nuclear weapons, others would inevitably follow, further constraining U.S. power. 47 In fact, since 41 Nye 1981, 18-20. 42 See Schelling 1966, 70-76; and George, Hall, and Simons 1971. 44 See Schelling 1966, 35-125; Powell 1990; Fearon 1994; Fearon 1997; and Slantchev 2007. 45 See Kroenig 2009. 46 U.S. Department of State 1965. 47 Gavin 2004 47 Gavin -2005 the Symington Amendment cut off military and economic aid to offending states, and the NNPA cut off U.S. nuclear energy cooperation, one might conclude that the policy was targeted especially at allies, since U.S. adversaries would not be receiving U.S. aid or nuclear cooperation in the first place.
The second criterion for credible threats, clear communication, is also met by the U.S.
sanctions policy, which was publicly codified in U.S. program-the greater the number of pathways through which a state is dependent on the U.S., the more likely it will be deterred by the threat of sanctions. In the pre-1976 period, meanwhile, dependence on the U.S. should have no effect on the probability of pursuing nuclear weapons.
As an initial, informal way of exploring this hypothesis, Tables 1 and 2 Singh and Way 2004; and Levite 2002-2003 . 61 The results are robust to using as dependent variables (1) exploration of nuclear weapons, (2) whether a state has an ongoing nuclear program, and (2) pursuit of nuclear weapons as defined by Jo and Gartzke 2007 . 62 The results are also robust to the use of probit, ReLogit, a linear probability model, and a linear probability model with country fixed effects. 63 States reenter the dataset when they abandon nuclear weapons programs. The results are robust to accounting for temporal dependence by including as covariates the number of years since the last pursuit of nuclear weapons, as well as the squared and cubic terms of this variable (see Carter and Signorino 2010) . The results are also robust to the exclusion of any individual country that pursued nuclear weapons. 64 I also conducted several placebo tests with different cutoff years. If the argument advanced in this paper is correct, the results should attenuate as one moves the cutoff further back in time (it should not completely eliminate the results since the moving the cutoff back to say, 1973, includes only 3 years where one would expect no effect with 24 years where one would expect an effect). This is indeed what we find: the results are attenuated as the cutoff date is moved further back, with the results completely disappearing when a 1964 cutoff date is used. Indeed, if a model is estimated on the 1964-1976 period alone, dependence on the U.S. has an insignificant effect. Finally, the results are also robust to a using a 1978 cutoff (when the Nuclear Suppliers Group was fully formed). 65 Post-treatment bias occurs when a variable is included as a control that is partially a consequence of the key causal variable. Because states have often signed the NPT only when they have decided against differences tell us how much the yearly probability of pursuing nuclear weapons changes in the pre-and post-1976 era as dependence on the U.S. increases, holding all control variables at their median. Table 4 displays the estimates and compares them to the substantive effects of the statistically significant control variables. Supporting the theoretical argument, they suggest that increases in dependence score significantly reduce the probability of proliferation, but only in the post-1976 era. In the pre-1976 era, dependence score has an insignificant, positive effect.
Specifically, the first differences suggest that an increase in the dependence score from 0 to 1 reduces the yearly probability of proliferation in the post-1976 era by .0018, with this difference significant at the 95% level. While this sounds small, proliferation is a rare outcome, and this first difference represents an approximately 536% decrease from the median yearly predicted probability of proliferation generated by the model. An increase to 2, 3, or 4 in dependence score proliferation and because this can be a response to U.S. pressure and sanctions threats, including it as a control may bias the results of dependence on the U.S. toward zero. See King and Zeng 2007, 201-202 . It is also possible that dependence on the U.S. in the post-1976 era caused states to be more secure vis-à-vis shared rivals, producing a spurious result. To account for this, I ran a model where I controlled for (1) the average number of MIDs a state experienced with the USSR/Russia over the past 5 years and (2) reduces the probability of proliferation by .0023 to .0025-between a 685% to 745% reduction from the median; all of these first differences are significant at the 95% level.
Figure 1 displays these first differences graphically. The figure shows that in the presanctions era, there is an insignificant, positive effect of changes in dependence score (the 95% confidence interval always includes zero). In the post-sanctions era, however, the first differences are always negative and significant (never crossing zero), as theoretically expected, with the biggest change in simply moving from 0 to 1 in the dependence score. While the first differences of moving from 1 to 2, 2 to 3, and 3 to 4 in the dependence score are still negative and statistically significant, they are much smaller in magnitude, suggesting that moving from 0 to 1 is most important. Although it is hard to tell from the figures, the 95% confidence intervals for first differences in the two eras never overlap. This means that we can infer with 95% confidence that the effect of dependence on the U.S. was different in the two eras. Figure 2 shows the first differences of moving from the pre-to post-sanctions era at different levels of dependence score. This treats dependence as the conditioning variable in the interaction term rather than era (as in Figure 1) . 68 The results suggest that for states with relatively low dependence on the U.S., (scores of 0 or 1) moving to the post-sanctions era is associated with an insignificant increase in the probability of pursuing nuclear weapons. For those with high dependence (scores of 3 or 4), moving to the post-sanctions era is associated with a significant decrease in the probability of pursuing nuclear weapons, as theoretically 68 Berry et al (2012) note that interaction terms are inherently symmetric (meaning that each component variable conditions the other) and therefore recommend constructing plots both ways. 69 Taken together, these results suggest that in the post-sanctions era, the biggest dampening effect is moving from no dependence to some dependence. However, moving from the pre to post-sanctions era has the biggest negative effect on states with the highest levels of dependence.
Finally, although the effect of dependence is insignificant in the pre-1976 era, the fact that it is positive in sign suggests a shift not just in magnitude but in direction: before the U.S.
sanctions policy, states dependent on the U.S. were actually marginally more likely to pursue nuclear weapons, ceteris paribus, perhaps due to greater access to nuclear technology and knowhow before the U.S. tightened its nonproliferation policy. This cuts against an important counterargument-that states dependent on the U.S. do not pursue nuclear weapons simply because they feel more secure-since before 1976 and the U.S. sanctions regime, states dependent on the U.S. were actually somewhat more likely to proliferate.
The Inefficacy of Imposed Sanctions
The argument suggests that starting in the late 1970s, states dependent on the U.S. have been deterred from proliferation, an assertion supported by the empirical evidence. This causes a selection effect: because only states with low dependence on the U.S. are likely to pursue nuclear weapons in this time period, the observed success rate for sanctions should be low-the U.S will not have the leverage necessary to succeed. 69 The estimates are statistically significant at the 90% confidence interval for dependence scores of 1, 3 and 4 and significant at the 95% level only for dependence scores of 4. For a list of country-years that the models suggest would have had a high risk of proliferation in the absence of the sanctions policy, see the online appendix. including them would make the success rate lower.
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The cases are presented in Table 5 below, and the evidence strongly confirms the theoretical prediction-that the overall success rate of sanctions should be low. Of course, the prediction that the success rate of imposed sanctions should be low is not unique-it could also be explained by the inherent inefficacy of sanctions or poor design and implementation. In order to provide greater confidence in my argument, I test theoretical predictions about the rare cases of observed sanction success, predictions unique to this article's argument.
Miscalculation and the Rare Cases of Observed Sanctions Success
The argument that states consider the risk of sanctions before pursuing nuclear weapons, and that this deters vulnerable states from starting nuclear weapons programs, holds only for states that are able to accurately assess the likelihood and costs of sanctions. To the extent that states underestimate the risk, there is room for vulnerable states to slip through and for explicitly targeted threats of sanctions to have an impact. This logic suggests two observable implications:
states with identifiable reasons for underestimating the risk of sanctions when initiating nuclear weapons programs should (1) be surprised at the threat of sanctions, and (2) those vulnerable states that underestimated the risk of sanctions should be likely to concede to subsequent threats of sanctions, once they are made credible, for fear of jeopardizing relations with the U.S. 76 In three cases where explicit evidence of a threat prior to imposition could not be found (South Africa 1975 , Iran 1992 , and Libya 1996 , I assume a private threat was made. Omitting these cases would make the success rate of threats 20% and the overall success rate 16.7%. 77 Pape 1997, 91-93. As a measure of whether states had reason to underestimate the risk of sanctions when they initiated their nuclear programs, I again turn to the shift we would expect to see when the U.S. began imposing sanctions as nonproliferation policy after 1976. Countries that started nuclear weapons programs prior to 1977 would undoubtedly underestimate the future probability of sanctions from the outset. After 1976 and the new emphasis on sanctions in U.S.
nonproliferation policy, we would expect precisely those states that started nuclear programs prior to 1977 but had not yet completed them to be most likely to fold in the face of sanctions, in particular those states with high dependence on the U.S.
The two countries that fit these criteria are South Korea and Taiwan. These represent two out of three successful cases of sanctions; there are no successes for sanctions against states that started programs post-1976 (and thus were more likely to accurately assess the risk of sanctions).
While Libya likely underestimated the probability of sanctions (having started its nuclear weapons program in 1970) and ultimately conceded to U.S.-led sanctions, the mechanism in this case is different. By the time Qaddafi initiated a nuclear weapons program in 1970, Libya was no longer highly dependent on the U.S.; moreover, the literature suggests that a combination of military threats and/or a change in Qaddafi's general preferences about international engagement were most relevant.
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Drawing on secondary sources and U.S. archival documents, I seek to confirm the theory's relevant observable implications in the South Korea and Taiwan cases: (1) that these states were surprised by the threat of sanctions and (2) that they subsequently ended their nuclear weapons programs due to the threat of sanctions, once the threat was made credible, because of their high dependence on the U.S. Superficially, these threats appeared to be successful, as Chiang Ching-kuo reiterated that Taiwan's policy was "not to manufacture nuclear weapons" and that "all nuclear research on Taiwan would be directed toward peaceful uses." 85 He pledged that Taiwan would cease all reprocessing activity and end attempts to purchase reprocessing technology abroad.
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Nonetheless, by December the ambassador was forced to admit, "we have rather compelling evidence that in spite of solemn and public assurances given by the GROC and personally by
Premier Chiang, the Chinese may not yet have given up their intentions of acquiring a capability for reprocessing nuclear fuels." Chien Fu complained that he had "seen a press report that U.S. would acquiesce in West German and French sales of reprocessing facilities to Brazil and Pakistan respectively" and "asked whether the U.S. was applying a 'double standard' with regard to its policy of opposing acquisition of reprocessing facilities." 88 Even after being informed that the new American policy was "global, and that the U.S. would be 'unstinting' in its efforts to prevent proliferation of Reiss, 1988, 81; and Englehardt 1996, 32. 112 Yager 1985, 199 
Conclusion
The argument and evidence presented here suggest that U.S. sanctions have indeed been an effective tool of nonproliferation policy, but that selection effects have rendered this success largely hidden. Because states consider the probability and cost of sanctions before initiating nuclear weapons programs, those that are highly vulnerable to U.S. sanctions are likely to be deterred from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place, so long as the threat of sanctions is credible. Meanwhile, those that choose to pursue nuclear weapons are likely to be highly insulated and able to weather the threat and imposition of sanctions. Thus, while observed sanctions campaigns are unlikely to succeed in halting ongoing nuclear programs, they do deter less insulated states that might otherwise have pursued nuclear weapons.
126 Meyer 1984 , 126. 127 Reiss 1988 See Pollack and Reiss 2004; Hersman and Peters 2006. On the causes of proliferation, the findings suggest we should move beyond focusing on the incentives and capacity to build nuclear weapons and pay more attention to disincentives.
While important theoretical works have emphasized the disincentives in terms of negative economic and security externalities, 129 sanctions have been largely ignored and systematic empirical testing has been rare. Moreover, the findings help resolve a puzzle in the nuclear proliferation literature: namely the disconnect between theoretical and qualitative empirical works that emphasize the role of allied security commitments and international trade openness in reducing motivations for nuclear proliferation 130 and quantitative studies that find these variables to be insignificant. 131 The findings suggest that international integration and security commitments may inhibit proliferation only to the extent that their continuation is contingent on nuclear abstinence, a condition that arguably did not exist until the advent of U.S. sanctions policies in the late 1970s. The key point is that many states quite rationally may prefer an independent nuclear arsenal, a nuclear ally, and an internationally integrated economy. Only when well-established sanctions policies make states choose between a nuclear arsenal and the latter two luxuries should international integration and allied security commitments significantly inhibit proliferation. More broadly, the results suggest the importance of historicizing the study of nuclear proliferation; for example, the disincentives to pursue nuclear weapons have not been constant over time and nuclear cascades may have failed to materialize partially because of determined efforts to prevent their occurrence by the United States.
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129 See Solingen 2007 and Paul 2000. 130 On the role of security commitments, see Betts 1977; Frankel 1993; and Sagan 1996-1997 In terms of theoretical implications for the study of sanctions, the findings suggest that sanctions can be effective even in the realm of national security, contrary to popular realist arguments. Thus, while the field has known since Drezner (2003) that selection effects understate the true efficacy of sanctions with regard to trade and environmental issues, we can now extend this argument to cases where security is more directly at stake.
In terms of policy implications, three in particular stand out. First, nonproliferation sanctions should continue to be employed by the United States, even though they are unlikely to halt active nuclear weapons programs. After all, the threat of sanctions is credible only to the extent that the U.S. actually employs them. The importance of credible signals also suggests that recent U.S. decisions to waive sanctions against India and Pakistan in 2001 and sign a major civilian nuclear deal with India in 2006 may reduce the efficacy of sanctions in the future-it should be harder to deter states to the extent that the actual imposition of sanctions is less automatic. On the other hand, both India and Pakistan suffered under years of sanctions prior to reaching this point, and most states cannot count on an exception being made for them.
Depending on the importance of relations with the U.S., the 'threat that leaves something to chance' may be enough. Moreover, although I've focused on the U.S. because they have the most extensive nonproliferation sanctions track record, the findings should be generalizable to other important bilateral relations. For example, if China and Russia had credible sanctions policies in the early 1980s, Iran may not have pursued nuclear weapons in the first place.
Second, U.S. international engagement provides critical leverage in the realm of nonproliferation-sanctions deter only states that are dependent on the U.S. economically and/or militarily. In other words, to the extent that the U.S. reduces its global economic and security commitments, a position that has become more attractive in recent years due to budget crisis and recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, it should expect a corresponding lack of nonproliferation leverage. This would be particularly problematic given recent research that suggests nuclear weapons may not be a reliable or consistent deterrent to conflict.
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Third and finally, gauging the success of sanctions solely by studying cases where they were imposed against states like Iran and North Korea is theoretically misguided; success should not be expected in such cases. In these "adversary" cases where the U.S. had little relationship with the proliferating state to begin with, multilateral sanctions involving important partners of the proliferating state or inducements (whether in the form of economic assistance or security assurances) are likely to be more effective since the U.S. has little to threaten in the way of sanctions on its own. 134 
